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THE EGREGIOUS VIOLATION EXCEPTION IN IMMIGRATION PROCEEDINGS: HOW TO RESOLVE THE
CIRCUIT SPLIT WITH A TOTALITY OF CIRCUMSTANCES APPROACH

Hetal Mistry

I. INTRODUCTION
On March 26, 2007, several armed and uniformed ICE officers arrived at a two-story
New Jersey apartment building at 4:30 a.m.1 They rang the entrance buzzer to the apartment
incessantly.2 One of the residents, Clara, opened the door to the building fearing there was an
emergency.3 She saw five or six ICE officers coming up the stairs.4 As they approached the
door, they showed her an administrative warrant they had for her sister, Maria. 5 The officers
asked Clara to verify her immigration status to which she stated she was a legal permanent
resident (“LPR”).6 Then they asked to enter the apartment at which time Clara allowed them to
enter, even though Maria was not there.7 At the time, Clara was unaware of the fact that she
could refuse to let them enter and was under the impression that the warrant gave the officers the
right to enter the apartment even if Maria had not been there.8 Several other people, along with
Clara’s brother, Erick Oliva-Ramos, lived in this apartment.9 Once in the apartment, the officer
ordered everyone to the living room.10 One of the ICE officers stood by the entrance to the
apartment, so that no one could leave.11 At no point did the officers identify who they were,
much less show a badge, or indicate why they were there to the rest of the residents. 12 The only

1

Oliva-Ramos v. Attorney General of the U.S., 694 F.3d 259, 261 (3d Cir. 2012).
Id. at 261-262.
3
Id. at 262.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
Oliva-Ramos, 694 F.3d at 262.
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Id.
2

indication the residents had that these were immigration officers were the green ICE uniforms
that the officers were wearing.13 The officers asked everyone about Maria and her legal status
and then began to question them about their nationalities and identities.14 They did not allow the
residents to stand or leave the door closed when using the bathroom.15 One officer ordered
Oliva-Ramos to get his identification documents, which indicated that he was a Guatemalan
citizen, and not lawfully present in the United States.16 When he followed orders and retrieved
his documents, an officer arrested Oliva-Ramos.17

Although Oliva-Ramos argued that the

identification documents should be suppressed as a fruit of an illegal search pursuant to the
exclusionary rule, the judge allowed them and ordered him deported from the United States.18
Over the past three decades, there has been controversy among the Federal Circuit Courts
on whether the exclusionary rule is applicable in immigration proceedings.

While the

exclusionary rule in clearly applicable in criminal proceedings, courts have long held that
immigration is not punishment and therefore the same constitutional protections are not
guaranteed in immigration proceedings.19 Courts have also divided over what conduct violates
the Fourth Amendment in the context of immigration proceedings.20
In 1984, the Supreme Court in INS v. Lopez Mendoza21 first addressed the issue of
whether the exclusionary rule was applicable to a civil deportation hearing.22 In Lopez Mendoza,
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after an unlawful arrest, the petitioner made an admission to his unlawful presence in the United
States.23 The court held that the exclusionary rule generally does not apply in deportation
proceedings, making illegally obtained evidence admissible against the noncitizen.24 At arriving
at this conclusion, the court, however, left a narrow opening that would allow the exclusionary
rule to apply in two situations in immigration proceedings.25 The first exception where the
exclusionary rule would apply is when INS officers committed widespread violations of the
Fourth Amendment.26 The court would also allow the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence in
situations of “egregious violations of Fourth Amendment or other liberties that might transgress
notion of fundamental fairness and undermine the probative value of the evidence obtained.”27
After the decision in INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, lower federal courts did not know how to
apply the two exclusionary rule exceptions in removal proceedings. As a result, the United
States Court of Appeals has split regarding the meaning of “egregious” within the exception for
egregious Fourth Amendment violations.28 Currently, the Circuit Courts are divided between a
conduct-based approach and a bad-faith approach. The conduct-based approach does not only
focus on the ICE officer and the severity of the alleged violation, but also focuses on the
probative value of the evidence.29 On the other hand, the bad faith approach is a broader view
that requires the noncitizen only to prove either that the actions by the ICE officers were
deliberate or that they should have known was in violation of the Fourth Amendment, focusing
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primarily on the violation.30 Without a uniform test between all circuits, noncitizens will be
more susceptible to removability in certain areas of the country.31 The Third Circuit, in OlivaRamos v. Attorney General of the United States, developed a workable and practical standard
that incorporated certain conduct developed from other circuits in one variation of the conductbased approach that if adopted by all courts will resolve this evidentiary issue.32
This comment will argue that the conduct-based totality of circumstances standard, used
in Oliva-Ramos,33 is the correct standard that will help courts interpret when the egregious
violation exception applies in removal proceedings. Part II will provide background of the
exclusionary rule and its application to removal hearings.34 Part III will discuss the various
approaches that the circuits have used, including the totality of circumstances conduct based test
employed Oliva-Ramos. Part IV will analyze why the Third Circuit approach is the correct
approach. Lastly, part V will conclude that in order for courts to apply a uniform standard to the
egregious violation exception, they should apply the standard set forth in Oliva-Ramos.

II. BACKGROUND: THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE AND ITS APPLICATION TO REMOVAL HEARINGS
A. The Exclusionary Rule
The exclusionary rule is a judicially created evidentiary doctrine derived from the
Fourth Amendment35 that requires that “all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in
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Gonzalez-Rivera v. INS, 22 F.3d 1441 (9th Cir. 1994).
See Generally Irene Scharf, The Exclusionary Rule in Immigration Proceedings: Where it was, Where it is, Where
it May Be Going, 12 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 53, 69 (2010).
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Oliva-Ramos v. Attorney General of the U.S., 694 F.3d 259, 259 (3d Cir. 2012).
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Id.
34
See Part II.
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U.S. CONST. amend. IV. (“The right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.”).
31

3

violation of the Constitution . . . [be] inadmissible in court.”36 This rule applies to all subsequent
evidence or “fruits” that are obtained or derive from the original illegal conduct by law
enforcement.37 In order for the evidence to be deemed admissible during a search or seizure, the
conduct by law enforcement must be justified by probable cause.38 An officer has probable
cause when the known facts and circumstances would warrant a reasonable person to believe that
there is evidence of wrongdoing.39
The primary purpose of this rule is to deter unlawful conduct by the police and
“effectuate the guarantee of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and
seizures.”40 It is, however, not a personal constitutional right for the victim whose privacy has
been breached.41

In order to challenge the admissibility of illegally obtained evidence, a

defendant must have suffered from a constitutional violation.42 This challenge is usually a
pretrial motion to suppress evidence and if defendant is successful, then the illegally obtained
evidence will be inadmissible at trial.43 This will further ensure that the defendant is given a fair
trial under their due process rights.44
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Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
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B. Immigration Proceedings in Contrast to Criminal Proceedings
Unlike the criminal proceedings, the Constitution does not explicitly provide for the
power to regulate immigration.45 Rather, through the plenary power doctrine, immigration is
regulated by the legislative and executive branches with the judicial branch having a very limited
role.46 Even though it gives Congress the authorization to control the naturalization process,
immigration law has developed through the various statutes and regulations created by both the
legislative and executive branches.47

The plenary power doctrine provides great judicial

deference when it comes to Congressional regulation of immigration.48 Unfortunately, for
noncitizens, because of this power, they are not afforded the same protections of the Constitution
as an American citizen.49 Noncitizens are still, however, afforded limited due process rights.50
They have the “privilege” of having counsel; however, the government will not provide one for
them in case they cannot afford one.51 They do however, have the right to “examine all the

45

Denise M. Fabiano, Immigration Law--Flores v. Meese: A Lost Opportunity to Reconsider the Plenary Power
Doctrine in Immigration Decisions, 14 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 257, 258 (1992).
46
Id.
47
Jon Feere, Plenary Power: Should Judges Control U.S. Immigration Policy?, (February 2009),
http://www.cis.org/plenarypower.
48
See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889)(noting that decisions made by the legislature to
exclude noncitizens are conclusive upon the judiciary); See also Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651
(1892)(also affirming that the executive branch’s immigration decision is final and the judiciary was not second
guess their decision); Matthews v. Diaz et al. 426 U.S. 67 (1976)( emphasizing that the Legislature or Executive are
“of a character more appropriate” to address the issues of immigration).
49
See Kleindienst v. Mandel et al., 408 U.S. 753 (1972) (Court upheld the exclusion of revolutionary Marxist
because this was a characteristic that Congress has forbidden using the plenary power limiting the noncitizen’s first
amendment rights); Matthews, 426 U.S. at 67 (Noncitizens had to be admitted in this country for 5 years before
they can receive Medicare.); See generally Jon Feere, Plenary Power: Should Judges Control U.S. Immigration
Policy?, (February 2009), http://www.cis.org/plenarypower.
50
See Yamataya v. Fisher 189 U.S. 86 (1903) (The respondent must be given notice of deportation and the
opportunity to be heard in order to satisfy due process in deportation hearings.) See generally United States ex rel.
Vajtauer v. Commissioner of Immigration, 273 U.S. 103 (1927) (stating that deportation without a fair hearing is a
denial of due process); Kwock Jan Fat v. White, 253 U.S. 454 (1920) (reversing a decision upholding the exclusion
of a United States citizen of Chinese descent due to the failure of the examining inspector to include testimony of
three witnesses favorable to the petitioner in the record of proceedings).
51
8 U.S.C. §1229a(b)(4)(A)(2000)(This is unlike criminal proceedings where the defendant has the right to an
attorney and if they cannot afford one, one will be appointed to them.).

5

evidence against [them], present evidence on [their] own behalf, and cross examine witnesses
presented by the Government.”52
Immigration deportation proceedings are different from the criminal justice system.
Unlike criminal proceedings, deportation proceedings are purely civil in nature.53

These

proceedings are meant, “to determine the noncitizen’s eligibility to remain in this country, not to
punish an unlawful entry.”54 The noncitizens’ unlawful entry is only necessary to look at to see
if it affects his right to remain in this country.55 The purpose of these proceedings is to “put an
end to a continuing violation of the immigration laws.”56
The immigration judge’s only power is to order deportation.57 Because this is a civil
proceeding, various safeguards that are given in the criminal context are not applicable in this
proceeding.58 For one, although the noncitizen “must be given a reasonable opportunity to be
present at the proceeding,” if they fail to appear, the proceeding may continue with or without
their presence.59 In a criminal proceedings on the other hand, a failure to appear will not
continue their proceeding unless a waiver of appearance has been executed.60 The burden of
proof also significantly varies between both proceedings.61 In deportation proceedings, the

52

Id.
INS v. Lopez Mendoza 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1974). But see Anita Ortiz Maddali, Padilla v. Kentucky: A New
Chapter in Supreme Court Jurisprudence on Whether Deportation Constitutes Punishment for Lawful Permanent
Residents? 61 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 30 (2011) (“Deportation involves both civil and criminal elements, making it
appear quasi-criminal.”); Patricia J. Schofield, Evidence in Deportation Proceedings, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1537, 1568
(1985)(“Deportation hearings should be recognized as the quasi-criminal proceedings that they in fact are.”).
54
8 U.S.C. §§ 1302, 1306, 1325.
55
8 U.S.C. §§ 1251, 1252(b).
56
Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1039.
57
Id.
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8 U.S.C. §1252(b).
60
See generally Erin Murphy, Manufacturing Crime: Process, Pretext, and Criminal Justice, 97 GEO. L.J. 1435,
1458 (2009).
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Matthew S. Mulqueen, Rethinking the Role of the Exclusionary Rule in Removal Proceedings, 82 ST. JOHN’S L.
REV. 1157, 1164-1166 (2008).
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government has the burden to show only identity and alienage.62 Then, the burden shifts to the
noncitizen to prove their lawful entry.63 In the criminal context the government is required to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt; however, in the immigration context the Board of Immigration
Appeals only requires clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence.64 The immigration judge’s
decision to deport the noncitizen “needs only to be based on reasonable, substantial and
probative evidence” offered by the Government at the hearing.65 The evidence of the alienage
and deportability of the noncitizen is usually gathered at the time of the arrest in a Form I-213,
Record of Deportable Noncitizen.66
If at the time of arrest the evidence was obtained through an illegal search and seizure, it
is crucial to the noncitizen that this evidence be excluded from the hearing.67 Since immigration
proceedings require a lower burden of proof for the Government, these documents would more
likely have the noncitizen deported than if they were not admitted into evidence.68 As a result,
these people would be torn from their homes, separated from their families, and snatched away
from their employment.69

C. ICE’s Home Raid Operations
As a response to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) was created under the newly established Department of
Homeland Security.70 These terrorist attacks further increased the need to tighten security

62

8 U.S.C. § 1361.
Id.
64
INS v. Lopez Mendoza 468 U.S. 1032, 1039 (1974).
65
8 U.S.C. §1252(b)(4).
66
See Martinez-Camargo v. INS, 282 F.3d 487, 489 (7th Cir. 2002).
67
Mulqeen, supra at 1165.
68
Id.
69
Id. at 1177.
70
Who Joined DHS, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, http://www.dhs.gov/who-joined-dhs; Id. at 1174-1176.
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measures on immigration, as the hijackers were all immigrants.71 ICE was designed to enforce
the immigration law, which includes the detention, removal, intelligence and investigation.72
The department’s main focus in enforcement is on high priority targets, as such the department
engages in home raid operations.73
These raids, however, must be conducted pursuant to the constitutional requirements in
the Fourth Amendment.74 Under the Fourth Amendment, people have the right to be protected
“in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.”75
Additionally, warrants are only to be issued “upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or things to be
seized.”76 In order to justify many searches and seizures, a warrant must be issued in advance
from a neutral and detached magistrate.77 Unlike arrests in public, searches or arrest in the
home, do require a warrant, unless the officer has fit into one of the exceptions. 78 Among those
exceptions, include the property owner’s valid consent to search.79
Notwithstanding these Constitutional mandates, immigrants allege that the ICE raids are
being conducted in such a way as to violate their constitutional rights.80 The number of raids by
ICE officers has “grown dramatically” in the recent years and with it arose much controversy. 81

71

Identity and Immigration Status of 9/11 Terrorists (2011), FEDERATION FOR AMERICAN IMMIGRATION REFORM,
available at http://www.fairus.org/issue/identity-and-immigration-status-of-9-11-terrorists.
72
Id.
73
Bess Chiu et al., CARDOZO IMMIGRATION JUSTICE CLINIC, Constitution on ICE: A Report on Immigration
Home Raid Operations 3 (2009) [hereinafter Cardozo Immigration Justice Clinic], available at http://
www.cardozo.yu.edu/uploadedFiles/Cardozo/Profiles/immigrationlaw-741/IJC_ICE-Home-RaidReport%20Updated.pdf.) at 6.
74
Id.
75
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
76
Id.
77
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 10-12 (1977).
78
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001).
79
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973).
80
Nathan Treadwell, Fugitive Operations and the Fourth Amendment: Representing Immigrants Arrested in
Warrantless Home Raids, 89 N.C. L. REV. 507 (2011).
81
Id. at 511.
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The widespread pattern of behavior included warrantless search of the premises, lack of consent
from residents before entry, and forceful entry.82 Consequently, courts have seen an increase in
pretrial suppression motions and have been trying to interpret the Supreme Court decision of
I.N.S. v. Lopez - Mendoza83 to see if the exclusionary rule would apply in removal proceedings.84

D. INS v. Lopez Mendoza
Until 1984, there was very little case law for the immigration judges to determine the
applicability of the exclusionary rule to immigration proceedings. Then the Supreme Court of
the United States granted certiorari in INS v. Lopez Mendoza to determine “whether an admission
of unlawful presence in this country made subsequent to an allegedly unlawful arrest must be
excluded as evidence in a civil deportation hearing.”85

In this case, the Supreme Court

consolidated two cases where the respondents were arrested at their place of employment when
the INS investigators impermissibly questioned the respondents.86

The court held that the

evidence obtained from the INS officers was admissible in civil deportation hearing.87 The court
did not conclude that the exclusionary rule does not apply to all removal hearings, but that it
would be inapplicable in most situations.88 The court did, however, suggest that the exclusionary
rule would apply narrowly and in two particular situations.89 The first situation, in immigration
proceedings, where the exclusionary rule would apply is called the widespread violation test.90
This requires there to be a “good reason to believe that the Fourth Amendment violations by INS
82

Id; See supra note 73.
INS v. Lopez Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984).
84
Nathan Treadwell, Fugitive operations and the Fourth Amendment: Representing Immigrants Arrested in
Warrantless Home Raids, 89 N.C. L. REV. 507, 527 (2011).
85
Lopez Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1051.
86
Id. at 1035-1037.
87
Id. at 1051.
88
Id. at 1050-1051.
89
Id. at 1050.
90
Id. at 1050.
83
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officers were widespread.”91 The second situation is the egregious violations test, which requires
that the “egregious violations of the Fourth Amendment or other liberties that might transgress
notions of fundamental fairness and undermine the probative value of the evidence obtained.”92
The court did a cost benefit analysis of excluding reliable evidence from a deportation
proceeding to arrive at the holding.93 The benefit of allowing the evidence to be excluded if
obtained in violation of the constitution would be to deter future unlawful police conduct. 94 The
Court noted, however, that there is a low deterrence value in the application of the exclusionary
rule in deportation proceedings.95 In addition, the Court noted that there are “unusual and
significant” societal costs.96 The Court’s main concern was that immigration judges are not well
versed in the Fourth Amendment, and applying the exclusionary rule would cause unnecessary
delays and “inordinate amount of time spent on such cases at all level [will cause] an adverse
impact on the effective administration of immigration laws.”97 The court noted that the INS
already has taken “sensible and reasonable steps” towards deterring INS officers from violating
the Fourth Amendment.98 Thus, in weighing the costs and benefits, the court held that the
balance weighs against applying the exclusionary rule in civil deportation proceedings.99
In this case, four Justices wrote strong dissents arguing for general applicability of the
exclusionary rule in civil deportation proceedings. Justice White wrote the strongest dissent
articulating that the exclusionary rule should apply in deportation proceedings and that the

91

Lopez Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1050.
Id. at 1050-1051.
93
Id. at 1042.
94
Id. at 1043-1044.
95
Id. at 1046.
96
Id. at 1046.
97
Lopez Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1048-1049.
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Id. at 1050.
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Id. at 1050.
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majority had an “incorrect assessment of the cost and benefits.”100 In his dissenting opinion he
stated how the cost and benefits in the deportation setting do not differ “in any significant way”
from the criminal setting.101 As for the deterrent value, Justice White explained that the INS
agents and police officers essentially have the same mission to use the evidence in the
proceedings and that the “civil deportation proceedings are to INS agents what criminal trials are
to police officers.”102 Justice White concluded that the exclusionary rule should apply but only
when “evidence has been obtained by deliberate violations of the Fourth Amendment or by
conduct a reasonably competent officer would know is contrary to the Constitution.”103 Justice
Brennan agreed with Justice White and found that the basis of and importance of the
exclusionary rule is derived from the Fourth Amendment itself, not because it had a deterrence
value.104 Further Justice Marshall also agreed that the exclusionary rule should apply to at least
some extent in deportation proceedings because “there is no other way to achieve the twin goals
of enabling the judiciary to avoid the taint of the partnership in official lawlessness and of
assuring the people-all potential victims of unlawful government conduct- that the government
would not profit from its lawless behavior.”105 Lastly, Justice Stevens agreed with Justice
White’s dissent.106

These four justices agreed that the exclusionary rule should apply in

deportation proceedings at least to some extent.

III. THE EGREGIOUS VIOLATIONS EXCEPTION CIRCUIT SPLIT

100

Lopez Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1052. (White, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1060. (White, J., dissenting).
102
Id. at 1054. (White, J., dissenting).
103
Id. at 1060. (White J., dissenting).
104
Id. at 1052. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The Government of the United States bears an obligation to obey the
Fourth Amendment; that obligation is not lifted simply because the law enforcement officers were agents of the
immigration and Naturalization Service, nor because the evidence obtained by those officers was to be used in civil
deportation hearings.”).
105
Id. at 1060-1061 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
106
Lopez Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1061. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
101
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Due to INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, the immigration judge can only apply the exclusionary
rule in two situations. The “egregious” violations exception involves conduct by INS officers
that is in violation of the Fourth Amendment that would weaken the value of the evidence
obtained and “transgress notions of fundamental fairness.”107 The courts have split on exactly
what situations would be considered “egregious” and have essentially left two types of positions.
The first approach is developed by the First and Second Circuits which apply a conduct-based
analysis that focuses on the conduct of the INS agents and whether it was egregious or not.108
This approach uses a list of factors to determine if the INS agent’s conduct rises to a level of
egregious.109 The second approach is led by the Ninth Circuit, which uses a bad faith approach
that analyzes whether the officer’s actions were reasonable or not.110

A. Majority: Conduct Based Approach
The conduct based approached is supported by the First, Second, Eighth and Eleventh
Circuits. This approach focuses mainly on the conduct of the officers and uses certain factors to
determine if the officer’s actions in arresting the noncitizen rises to level an “egregious”.
The First Circuit addressed this issue in Kandamar v. Gonzales.111 Here, the noncitizen
overstayed his visa and was issued an National Security Entry-Exit Registration System
(“NSEERS”) notice, which was a notice of registration only given to certain young males from
designated countries indicating that they had to appear and interview before the Department of

107

Id. at 1050-1051.
Kate Mahoney, What to do when the constable blunders? Egregious Violations of the Fourth Amendment in
Removal Proceedings, IMMIGRATION LAW ADVISOR, (Sept. 2012), http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/ILANewsleter/ILA%202012/vol6no8.pdf.
109
Id.
110
Id.
111
464 F.3d 65 (1st Cir. 2006).
108
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Homeland Security.112

At this interview, the Department of Homeland Security officer

concluded that the noncitizen be put into removal proceedings for overstaying his visa and there
he was ultimately determined removable.113 At the removal hearing, Kandamar made a motion
to suppress the evidence obtained in the DHS interview because it was a denial of his due
process and equal protection rights, but the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied this motion.114 In
this case, he challenged the denial of the motion to suppress and the First Circuit Court affirmed
the denial.115

Here, the Court first determined there is an egregious violation when the

government uses “threats, coercion, or physical abuse”116

The court concluded that this

interview did not rise to that level because it neither asked Kandamar to leave, told him to leave
or restrain him from leaving in any way.117 Therefore, there was no denial of Kandamar’s due
process or equal protection rights.118 Kandamar next argued to suppress his passport because it
constituted as a seizure and was fundamentally unfair.119 The court held that because he suffered
no prejudice from the seizure of the passport, that it did justify the reversal of the removal
order.120 Further, the court addressed Lopez Mendoza stating, “evidence will be excluded if the
circumstances surrounding a particular arrest and interrogation would render use of the evidence
obtained thereby fundamentally unfair and in violation of due process requirements of the Fifth
Amendment.”121

Thus, the court determined the type of conduct that would constitute an

egregious violation, which set a relatively high standard for the noncitizen to meet.

112

Id. at 67.
Id. at 68.
114
Id. at 69.
115
Id. at 74.
116
Id. at 71.
117
Kandamar, 464 F.3d at 72.
118
Id. at 71.
119
Id. at 74.
120
Id.
121
Id. at 70. (citing Navarro-Chalan v. Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 19, 22-23)(Internal citations omitted).
113
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The most notable case that adopted this approach arose from the Second Circuit. In
Almedia-Amaral v. Gonzales,122 the noncitizen was a minor who was found by a border patrol
agent just as he was crossing into the United States through Texas. 123 He was subsequently
asked to stop and provide identification.124 The noncitizen provided the agent with a Brazilian
passport and was then arrested and taken into custody for not having a U.S. Passport.125 While in
custody, he gave a statement that he later sought to suppress arguing that since he was an
unaccompanied minor his statement was in violation of the Fourth Amendment.126 The motion
to suppress was denied by the IJ and BIA.127 Here, the court found that the conduct of the agent
was not so egregious to warrant suppression of the evidence.128 According to the Second Circuit,
to warrant an exclusion of evidence in a deportation proceeding, the record of evidence must
establish either (1) an egregious violation occurred, which was fundamentally unfair, or (2)
regardless of the egregiousness, the violation “undermined the reliability of the evidence in
dispute.”129 The court offered two situations in which the egregious violation hat occurred was
fundamentally unfair.130

The first situation is based on the validity of the stop and the

“characteristics and severity of the offending conduct.”131 The court explained that if the officer
were to stop the noncitizen for no reason at all and if the seizure was not severe, then it would
not constitute an egregious violation.132 The second situation that the Second Circuit addressed
that would be egregious would be if it were based on “race or some other grossly improper

122

461 F.3d 231 (2nd Cir. 2006).
Id. at 232.
124
Id.
125
Id.
126
Id. at 233.
127
Id.
128
Almedia-Amaral, 461 F.3d at 235.
129
Id. at 235.
130
Id.
131
Id.
132
Id.
123
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consideration”, even though the seizure itself was not severe.133 Although the court pointed out
these two situations, it was in no way intended to be an exhaustive list of circumstances.134
Additionally, the court further explained that the seizure itself would be severe or unreasonable
“when the initial stop is particularly lengthy [or] there is show or use of force.”135 This circuit
has given other courts guidance on how to interpret the small opening left by Lopez Mendoza
with a workable test.
The Eighth Circuit also adopted a conduct-based approach. In 2010, in Puc-Ruiz v.
Holder,136 the noncitizen was arrested in a restaurant where he worked when the local police
entered the premises without a warrant.137 The police justified their warrantless entry with a
suspicion that a local ordinance was being violated.138 When officers asked for identification,
the noncitizen provided a valid license.139 After being taken to the police station for violation of
the ordinance, ICE officials were contacted and two interviews were conducted that revealed the
noncitizen to be removable for being an undocumented foreign national.140 Puc-Ruiz argued that
the evidence obtained from his arrest at the restaurant should be suppressed because the police
arrested him without probable cause and therefore the use of any evidence obtained would be
fundamentally unfair.141

The court did not agree with Puc-Ruiz and held that “arresting

noncitizen without probable cause was not sufficiently egregious to require suppression of
evidence obtained as result of that arrest.”142 Here, the court noted that for the conduct to be
considered egregious, there needs to be more than just a violation, but the conduct does not need
133
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to be limited to just physical brutality.143 In arriving at this conclusion, the court used the
standard derived from the Second Circuit determining the police officers did not use an
unreasonable show or use of force nor did Puc-Ruiz claim that the arrest was based on race.144
Further, the court mentioned that in this case there was at least some articulable suspicion to
justify the warrantless entry because the information about the ordinance violation was a given
tip.145
The Eleventh Circuit is the final circuit to employ the conduct based approached. In
Ghysels-Reals v. U. S. AG,146 an noncitizen was detained after a routine traffic stop.147 The
noncitizen argued that the stop was unlawful and as a result, the evidence obtained from the stop
should be suppressed.148 Here, the court concluded that the traffic stop did not rise to a level of
egregious that would warrant a suppression of the evidence.149 The court explained that the
noncitizen was not subjected to any “abuse, force, racial profiling or other conduct that rises to
the level required for exclusion.”150 The court used some of the factors that the Second Circuit
developed in its interpretation. Similarly, it also left open the possibility that there is other
conduct that would be egregious and the court did not want to limit that possibility.

B. Minority: Bad Faith Approach
The Ninth Circuit developed the bad faith approach, which places a lower burden on the
noncitizen to prove egregious conduct on the part of the officer in comparison to the conduct-

143

Id. at 778.
Id. at 778-779.
145
Id. at 779.
146
418 Fed. Appx. 894 (11th Cir. 2011).
147
Id. at 895.
148
Id.
149
Id.
150
Id.
144

16

based approach. This standard was first created in Gonzalez-Rivera v. INS.151 Gonzalez was
arrested after failing to show proper documentation at a traffic stop.152 Gonzalez alleged that he
was stopped “solely on the basis of his Hispanic appearance” and wanted to suppress the
evidence obtained in the illegal stop.153 The court concluded that this was a race-based stop,
which was egregious and warranted a suppression of the evidence.154
conclusion, the court articulated an objective bad faith standard.

155

In arriving at this

Under this standard, a

violation occurs when “evidence is obtained by deliberate violation of the fourth amendment or
by conduct a reasonable officer should have known is in violation of the Fourth Amendment.”156
The court further elaborated on the conduct the police officer should have known in MartinezMendoza v. Holder.157 Here, the court determined that the bad faith standard also includes an
analysis to see if the agents are “acting against an unequivocal doctrinal backdrop.”158 The court
explained here, that a search would violate a noncitizen’s Fourth Amendment right because the
government cannot show proper entry into the noncitizen’s premises from defendant’s silence or
objection to entry.159 Therefore, an egregious violation would still occur because the officer’s,
even if they did not know, they should have known that entering into the noncitizen’s home
without a warrant, consent or exigent circumstances would violate the noncitizen’s Fourth
Amendment rights.160 Hence, the bad faith standard developed by the Ninth Circuit involves bad
faith conduct by the police officer that the officer either deliberately committed or should have
known it was in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
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Further, this test has been seen by both supporters of the test as well as critics as an
objective standard that relies on what the reasonable officer would have done in the same
situation rather than the officer’s subjective intent.161

This would make the test an easier

standard for the noncitizen to satisfy because they only have to prove a violation on the part of
the officer, instead of what the actual officer was thinking at the time of the violation. Unlike the
conduct-based test, the minimal threshold is much lower. In the conduct- based test, in addition
to proving that the violation occurred, the noncitizen also has to show one of the aggravating
factors set forth by that Circuit. The Ninth Circuit is the only court that has adopted this standard
and ironically has also granted more suppression motions than the circuits that have adopted the
conduct based approach.162 It is questionable whether there is a correlation between this specific
approach and successful suppression motions than, but it is worth noting.
Other courts have criticized this approach. The Eighth Circuit in Garcia-Torres v.
Holder,163 in a footnote, declined to adopt the bad faith standard. The Court reasoned that it
would “eviscerate Lopez-Mendoza insofar as the Fourth Amendment prohibits only
unreasonable searches and seizures and the Ninth Circuit’s standard applies whenever a
reasonable officer should have known his conduct was illegal.”164 Essentially, this standard
would completely disregard the rule set forth in Lopez Mendoza.165 Although this approach
would have a lower of burden of proof for the noncitizen, that burden is too low. With the need
for increased security measures after the September 11th terrorist attacks, a reasonable standard
needs to be set, which will balance both the security risks as well the noncitizen’s constitutional
161

Kate Mahoney, What to do when the constable blunders? Egregious Violations of the Fourth Amendment in
Removal Proceedings, Immigration Law Advisor, (Sept. 2012), http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/ILANewsleter/ILA%202012/vol6no8.pdf.
162
See generally Lopez-Rodriguez v. Mukasey, 536 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that the ICE agents that
entered without consent to the noncitizen’s home constituted as an egregious violation.).
163
660 F.3d 333 (8th Cir. 2011).
164
Id. at 337 n.4.
165
Mahoney, supra.

18

rights.166 The Third Circuit also criticized this rule and explained that this standard would create
“routine invasions of the constitutionally protected privacy rights of the individual.”167 Not only
have other circuit courts criticized this approach, but also the Circuit Court Judges within the
circuit have deemed this standard as “qualified immunity from civil liability for constitutional
violations by Government officials.”168

C. Remaining Circuits and lack of standards
The Fifth and Seventh Circuits have addressed the issue of the interpretation of the
egregious violation, but without specifically developing a standard. The Seventh Circuit merely
addressed one specific circumstance and set of facts that it deemed not be egregious.169 In this
particular situation, there was an alleged warrantless arrest during which agents aggressively
handcuffed and yelled at the noncitizen telling him “sign the f***ing papers claiming he did not
have any rights.”170 Here, the court concluded that very minor physical abuse along with
“aggressive questioning” employed by the agents against the noncitizen would not rise to a level
of egregious conduct that would violate the Fourth Amendment.171 The court explained that
verbal commands to instruct a person to sign papers would not be a search or seizure to trigger
the protections of the Fourth Amendment.172 The court, additionally noted that handcuffing an
uncooperative and resisting noncitizen also does not constitute as egregious behavior that the
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Lopez-Mendoza Court anticipated.173

Therefore, the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of

egregious behavior is something higher than mere handcuffing or aggressive verbal
commands.174 Besides, this one case, the Seventh Circuit has provided no other guidance on
how to analyze conduct that would egregious.
Lastly, the Fifth Circuit has attempted to define a clear standard, but has yet to develop a
workable standard. In Gonzalez-Reyes v. Holder,175 the court determined that “the test for
admissibility of evidence in a removal proceeding is whether the evidence is probative and
whether its use is fundamentally fair so as not to deprive the noncitizen of due process of law.”176
Here, the noncitizen alleged that he was deprived of due process because he did not know of his
right to remain silent or his right to retain counsel.177 The court held that a Miranda warning
denial is not egregious because they are not required in the immigration and more specifically
the deportation context.178 The Fifth Circuit also addressed this issue more recently in TorresHernandez v. Holder.179 Here, the noncitizen moved to suppress in the information contained in
Form I-213 on account of coercion and duress.180 The Court denied the motion noting that there
was no coercion by the officers that would be considered to be egregious. 181 The main focus of
the court, however, was on the accuracy of the evidence obtained by the officers rather than the
conduct employed to receive the information.182 This approach by the Fifth Circuit, relating to
the accuracy of the evidence in relation to an egregious violation, is not one that has been
addressed by other courts, nor has it been addressed by the Fifth Circuit again
173
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D. Correct Approach: Totality of Circumstances Conduct Based Approach
Oliva Ramos v. Attorney General of the United States was a case of first impression in
the Third Circuit addressing the issue of whether the exclusionary rule applied in removal
proceedings.183 As mentioned in the beginning of this comment, ICE officers forced their way
into the New Jersey apartment and demanded identification papers from Olivia-Ramos.184
Oliva-Ramos argued that the evidence should be suppressed because “the ICE agents
failed to obtain proper consent to enter the apartment.”185 Additionally, Oliva-Ramos argued
that they arrested him without a warrant and probable cause, or reasonable suspicion.186 The
court ultimately allowed Oliva-Ramos to reopen his proceedings.187 The Third Circuit, however,
acknowledged that it had not yet considered what situations would constitute an egregious
violation.188 The court analyzed the Ninth Circuit’s bad faith approach, but concluded that
would be a difficult standard to work with.189 The court reasoned that “focusing only on [the
officer’s] good faith would permit conduct that may be objectively reasonable based on
directives of the Department of Homeland Security, but nevertheless result in routine invasions
of the constitutionally protected privacy rights of the individuals.”190
After rejecting the Ninth Circuit approach, the court adopted the conduct-based test
developed by the Second Circuit with a slight modification.191 In order for the evidence to be a
“result of the egregious violation within the meaning of Lopez Mendoza, . . . the record evidence
[must establish] either (a) that a constitutional violation that was fundamentally unfair had
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occurred, or (b) that the violation – regardless of its unfairness – undermined the reliability of the
evidence in dispute.”192 When applying this test, the court explained that whether or not there
was probative value to the evidence, it should not be part of the inquiry.193 Based on this
exception, the court remanded the case back to the BIA to determine “whether the ICE agents
violated Oliva-Ramos’s Fourth Amendment rights and whether those violations were
egregious.”194 Additionally the court also stated that when addressing this standard, it must be a
“flexible case by case approach” that is based around several factors. 195 However, unlike most
other courts, this court listed several factors that the BIA should consider when arriving at its
conclusion.196

These factors include: (1) whether the noncitizen can establish intentional

violations of the Fourth Amendment by the officers, (2)”whether the seizure itself was so gross
or unreasonable in addition to being without a plausible legal ground,” (3) “whether improper
seizures, illegal entry of homes or arrests incurred threats, coercion or physical abuse,” (4) “the
extent to which the agents repot the unreasonable show of force,” and (5) whether any seizure or
arrests were based on race of perceived ethnicity.”197 Furthermore, consistent with the other
circuits following the conduct-based approach, the Third Circuit suggested that “the
characteristics and severity of the police conduct” should be relevant to the inquiry. 198
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IV. OLIVA-RAMOS IS THE CORRECT APPROACH TO RESOLVE THE CIRCUIT SPLIT

The standard that the Third Circuit developed is the correct approach that should be
adopted by all the circuits. It will bring uniformity among all the circuits because this approach
ties together the ideas of the circuits behind the conduct-based approach and it is the most
practical approach in relation to public policy.

A. Uniform approach incorporating the Other Circuits
This approach taken by the Third Circuit has incorporated the ideas from several other
circuits that also follow the conduct-based approach. First, the Third Circuit adopted the Second
Circuit test with a slight modification: the Second Circuit required “a violation” whereas in Third
Circuit required a “constitutional violation” to be fundamentally unfair.199 Therefore, the Second
and Third Circuits both agreed that the probative value of evidence is not required.200 The Third
Circuit also used the characteristics and severity of the conduct situation as one of the factors that
could be egregious.201 Next, the Third Circuit Court addressed some of the factors listed in the
First Circuit, which include “threats, coercion, or physical abuse.”202 The Court also included
factors from the Eighth Circuit, which include “physical brutality and unreasonable show or use
of force.”203 The Third Circuit took all these factors and made it into one inquiry of factors that
should be considered, but again emphasized as with the other court, that it is not a list of
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exhaustive factors.204 As a result, the Third Circuit Court created a totality of circumstances test
for the conduct-based approach.205
Additionally, by incorporating all the circuits’ different factors into one inquiry, the court
also noted that this would make it more of an individualized test, which would be based on a
case-by-case approach.206 Essentially this will allow the respondent to feel as if the system is
individualized to them and giving them a fair hearing instead of a predetermined judgment.
Further, by incorporating all the factors from other circuits, the Third Circuit decision is
“instructive” for practicing attorneys.207 In a practice advisory issued shortly after this case, it
stated that the opinion would be “useful to practitioners litigating the exception for the first
time.”208 Therefore, not only will this case bring uniformity to all the judges hearing this case,
but it will also allow practicing attorneys a guideline on how to approach their own cases and
clients and provide for effective client representation.209 Without this uniformity, clients may
feel it necessary to move to a different jurisdiction that could increase their likelihood of success
in immigration proceedings.210 As a practical matter for both judges and attorneys, this approach
provides the most guidance on how to determine if an egregious violation occurred.
Even though it has been argued that this standard is “likely to breed unpredictability and
may lead to arbitrary results”, it provides a combination of factors for the courts as well as
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practicing attorneys to consider.211 Since this is a case-by-case approach, these factors will help
to predict what types of behaviors by officers will be considered violations on the egregious
spectrum. Although this approach is not perfect, it provides the most realistic approach to
determining what an egregious violation is.

B. Practical under Public Policy
In allowing the exclusionary rule to apply in deportation proceedings, many
undocumented non-citizens’ Fourth Amendment rights will be protected.212 This decision will
allow for the noncitizens to “seek redress for constitutional grievances.”213

Among the

population in the United States, immigrants are the most vulnerable and the ones that are taken
advantage the most.214 The immigrant population is more likely to have less education than
others and have less financial resources to even consider hiring counsel.215 Additionally, most
immigrants also lack the knowledge of the U.S. legal system and their rights.216
The Department of Homeland Security also has its own constitutional requirements that
provide Fourth Amendment protections for a non-citizen noncitizen.217 These constitutional
requirements apply to ICE’s conduct in home raids, which include seeking a judicial warrant
before entering a home, rather than just an administrative warrant.218

However, the

administrative warrant can be sufficient if there is informed consent by the occupant of the
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residence.219 According the DHS manual, during a home raid if consent is given, the ICE agent
may ask questions about the intended target, or other people they encounter in the home. 220 An
ICE agent, however, may not detain an occupant unless he or she has a “reasonable suspicion
based on specific articulable facts, that the person being questioned is a noncitizen in the United
States.”221 The data collected by this clinic shows that the ICE agents “failed to obtain lawful
consent to enter homes in violation of the Constitution in a large percentage of cases.” 222 This
proves that the ICE agents need to be deterred. If the exclusionary rule is not applicable, then the
agents will continue to violate the constitution knowing that the unlawfully obtained evidence
from the arrest will be applicable to the deportation proceeding.
The Third Circuit decision is considered by many to be a victory because it will create
awareness to the public of the unconstitutional policies employed by ICE.223 For example, in
2008, ICE agents used a gun to threaten a nine-year old boy and his parents while his mother was
showering.224 Their extreme policing procedures have also included a tremendous form of
humiliation by forcing a resident to stand in his underwear before his brother, sister in law and
children while the agents conducted a warrantless search of their home.225 As seen in OlivaRamos, the agents did not at first allow the Clara to use the bathroom or retrieve any feminine
products when she began menstruating during the raid and when they finally allowed her to she
was forced to the door open with an ICE agent standing right outside the door.226 These tactics
used by ICE agents are not only violations of the noncitizen’s Fourth Amendment rights, but
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they are violent, intrusive and humiliating.227 Further, most of these intrusions occurred before
7:00 a.m. and involved a display of weapons.228
In 2009, students in the Cardozo Immigration Justice Clinic at the Cardozo School of
Law conducted a report on immigration home raid operations, which brought greater awareness
to these extreme policing procedures employed by ICE agents.229 The report found that ICE
agents have an established a pattern of widespread misconduct during home raids which include
illegal entry of homes without legal authority, seizure of non-targeted individuals, illegal search
of homes, and seizure based on race or ethnicity230 and limited English proficiency.231 In their
study, the data collected showed that most arrests by ICE agents were for collateral arrests as
opposed to the targeted arrests in which they sought initial entry. 232 Further this report indicates
that the number of suppression motions overall have increased since 2006 when ICE created new
performance expectations and increased their home raid operations.233

This recent rise in

suppression motions is an indicator of a pattern of illegality that ICE agents use in home raid
operations.234 Although these numbers suggest that ICE agents are merely trying to meet a
quota, there is much more at stake for the noncitizen they arresting. Not only are their Fourth
Amendment rights violated, but their risk of being separated from their families, losing their
livelihood, and being sent back to a country with fewer opportunities is highly increased by these
agent’s policing strategies.

The method employed by the Third Circuit will heighten the
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awareness of the severity of the misconduct by taking into consideration every step that affected
the immigrant.
Critics argue that without the exclusionary rule applicable to deportation proceedings,
“many ICE violations will go unpunished”235 and will “undermine the traditional crime fighting
mission of local law enforcement agencies.”236 Some believe that this decision will “go a long
way in reigning in the extreme policing strategies” that ICE uses.237 In hindsight, the efforts of
ICE to tighten the security in the realm of immigrant after the September 11th attacks will be lost
by the methods employed by the agents.

Even though now is the time that immigration

enforcement should be stricter, it does not mean that it has to be at the hands of the immigrant.
By analyzing the totality of circumstances, ICE officers will be more aware of their extreme
policies and will now know the extent to which they can conduct these raids. This will prove to
be a deterrent for the ICE officers because they care about prosecutions and convictions.238
Further, this will be likely to improve the agency’s and local law enforcement’s relationship with
immigrant communities.239

V. CONCLUSION
After INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, the Court left a small opening to allow for the exclusionary
rule to apply in very limited circumstances. One of these circumstances included egregious
violations and it is with that that the circuit courts have struggled to interpret today. Fortunately,
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the Third Circuit rendered an instructive decision in Oliva-Ramos that will resolve the circuit
split. The correct standard that should be used is the totality of circumstances conduct based
approach with the following test: “the record evidence [must establish] either (a) that a
constitutional violation that was fundamentally unfair had occurred, or (b) that the violation –
regardless of its unfairness – undermined the reliability of the evidence in dispute.”240 This
decision incorporates all the relevant factors the circuit courts used within the conduct-based
approach.

Further, this decision has implicated practical considerations in spreading the

awareness of the extreme ICE policing strategies and providing Fourth Amendment protection to
undocumented non-citizens. Lastly, the opposing bad faith approach is not a workable standard
that any court should consider. The federal circuits should have a uniform standard and adopt
the test and reasoning of the Third Circuit. This will allow for noncitizens in different circuits to
be treated equally and not be advantaged because their circuit has adopted a lower standard to
prove egregious conduct of the officer.
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